Australia is currently faced with a strategic and economic dilemma regarding its interactions with China and the United States (US). On the one hand, it should maintain and strengthen its strategic relations with the US as an ally in order to contain a rising China. On the other hand, Australia should ensure its economic growth by strengthening trade relations with China.
Introduction
In the field of international relations, commercial liberals believe that economic cooperation can forestall or reduce the likelihood of conflict. The purpose of trade amongst countries is essentially to share economic benefits between each other, as well as to build strong relationships. A great deal of trade nowadays is set up by the World Trade Organization (WTO) which facilitates not only bilateral but also multilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
1 One example of a bilateral FTA is the China Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA). After signing the Trade and Economic Framework in 2003, both Australia and the People's Republic of China made further bilateral commitments to enter into a new phase of FTA negotiation.
2 Clearly, this represented a further strengthening of economic relations between Australia and China. Yet, some argue that China is actually using its trade cooperation to seek power in the Asia Pacific. 3 To be more precise, China is using trade as the means to build a soft hegemony in the Asia Pacific in order to become a superpower. Unfortunately, many are very concerned that China may then adapt America's model of the Monroe Doctrine to assert its regional rise, thereby challenging US' power in the Asia Pacific. 4 Others maintain that China is using its economic influence to search for great power potential to weaken the US regional primacy in Asia Pacific, and Australia has become entangled in that tactic. By implementing ChAFTA, both countries expect to increase trade and share the benefits. According to data from DFAT, almost all of Australia's resources, energy and manufacturing exports would enter China dutyfree within four years of the agreement (2019).
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ChAFTA is expected to enhance the competiveness of Australian agricultural exports to China, eliminating tariffs on meat, dairy and wine. It is believed Australian consumers and businesses will have access to cheaper and a more diverse range of Chinese goods and services.
17 ChAFTA will deliver Australian services providers a significant leg-up in the Chinese economy. ChAFTA will also promote Chinese investment in Australia, fuelling future economic growth by lifting the screening threshold for private Chinese investments in non-sensitive sectors.
18 Specifically, ChAFTA set China's tariffs at zero over 85 per cent (by 2015 value) of Australian exports would enter China duty free or at preferential tariff rates by the time it came into force. This amount would increase to 93 per cent coverage by 1 January 2019 and 98 per cent when ChAFTA is fully implemented. Australian import tariffs has been set by ChAFTA at zero on 82 per cent of China's exports to Australia from day one, rising to 100 per cent tariff elimination by 1 January 2019.
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In comparison, many observers believe that the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) offers fewer benefits to Australia. For example, the AUSFTA failed to cover all sectors, excluding sugar, and forestalling the removal of tariffs on Australian beef and dairy. 20 The exclusion of sugar has been discussed by Australian farmers as well as some American commentators, maintaining that it is inconsistent with Bush's statements regarding the opening of all sectors under AUSFTA. DFAT stated that: In short, it can be argued that AUSFTA was in some respects disappointing for Australia. As a consequence, it may have produced a shift in the way Australia perceives its relations with the US. Indeed, as observed by Kelton, there was a structural fragility in Australia's efforts to respond to shifts in the international system, in particular to the formulation of policy choices towards the US in terms of the delivery of trade outcomes 19 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Guiding to using ChAFTA to export or import. Retrieved from https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/inforce/chafta/doing-business-with-china/Pages/guideto-using-chafta-to-export-or-import.aspx 20 Clarke and Gao, op.cit., pp. 844 21 Ibid, pp. 845 concerning AUSFTA. 22 Moreover, Armstrong found that there was not only a reduction in trade between the US and Australia but also in their exports and imports. The coefficient estimate (in proportional change terms) for trade between the United States and Australia due to AUSFTA is -0.304. 23 He also maintained that trade diversion had occurred as a result of AUSFTA due to the collapse of US trade in 2008 and global finance crisis. Interestingly, he observed that the trade diversion between Australia-US may have fallen without the implementation of AUSFTA.
24
Regarding ChAFTA, this agreement is expected to offer greater benefits to Australia despite the fact that it failed to deal with sugar in AUSFTA (failed also to deal with tariffs for cotton, rice, and wheat). 25 Even so, ChAFTA covers other important sectors which were not covered in AUSFTA such as dairy products, beef, mining and wine. Tariffs on these products will be scrapped as well China's tariffs on Australian resources and energy products. contrast, the US dominated about 11.9 % share of Australia's global imports in terms of goods and services, followed by China (9.8 % share).
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With regard to the two-trading partners, on the other hand, China still remained the most important country for Australia accounting for a 23.3 % share of total goods and services, followed by Japan (10.9 % share) and the US (8.4 % share). 33 In a nutshell, it is clear that China is a more important partner for Australia in terms of trade.
The impact of ChAFTA on the Australia-US alliance (ANZUS)
In order to assess the impact of ChAFTA on the future of the strategic Australia-US alliance (ANZUS), two previous events regarding the triangular relationship will be examined; first, the case of China-US tensions over Taiwan, and second, the case of US development of a National Missile Defense system (NMD). During the 1996 Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan and China again claimed Taiwan as part of its territory and reiterated the need for reunification in which Beijing reasserted 'One China policy'. The US, which had supported Taiwan for some time in order to contain communism, intervened and asserted that reunification by force was forbidden. 34 This standoff pressured Canberra, a US ally in the Asia Pacific to take a position. Ibid, pp. 42 join the US in that conflict, it may have repercussions for the Alliance.
In response to the 'Armitage Scenario', President Jiang Zimen firmly warned Australia about the "very serious consequences' of intervening in a US-Taiwan conflict. President Zimen again responded to Armitage's statements when he visited Australia the following week.
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During the visit Prime Minister Howard stated that Australia's position would be to remain neutral in the case of a US-China conflict over Taiwan. Thus, despite pressure from the US, Australia stood firm, announcing a two-pronged policy approach emphasizing Australia's neutral position.
42 Subsequently, Australia and China advanced their bilateral trade relations, signing several agreements facilitating the export of Australian minerals, and the negotiations for the export of Australian liquid natural gas (LNG) to China.
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In the case of the US National Missile Defense system (NMD), here Australia was pressured by the US to work closely on the development of a "high technology defense force". Indeed, Harvard University strategic analyst Robert D. Blackwill, a specialist in US alliance relations in Asia, pressured Australia to become actively involved in the American-led NMD. 44 Interestingly, even though Australia had previously participated in missiles research and development, on this occasion it refused to play a significant role in the development of the NMD. In September 1997, for instance, Australia would not fully engage with the US in the project DUNDEE (Down Under Early Warning Experiments) which included the involvement of Australia's JINDALEE over-thehorizon radar which enabled to monitor air and In this context, China had made some efforts to weaken Australia's collaboration with the US. This can be seen in Chinese press commentaries condemning US regional allies for possible participation in the NMD.
48
By strengthening trade relations with Australia through ChAFTA, Beijing believed it might be able to reduce Australia's involvement in NMD, and thereby also weaken the ANZUS alliance. Beijing also endeavored to push Australia away from ANZUS by proposing Australia become a predominantly region-centric power, one concerned with security measures in the Asia Pacific, such as acting as a peacekeeping forces East Timor, and encouraging Australia to join the biannual Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM). 62 Even though there are regular AUSMIN meetings between Australia and the US, it must be said that Australia now perceives China differently.
The US, in these circumstances, is expected to admit the re-emergence of China as a natural process in the international system. As observed by Lee, there were not any countries that increased military capability as well as economic sector outside of the US-led Western alliance system and rising as a great power since the post War-World Two; yet China did. 63 China, one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, should be acknowledged as a great power because no one can argue that Beijing is now expanding its influence to pursue hegemony in the Asia Pacific through FTAs with Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN. Indeed, John Maersheimer, in examining great powers in action, found that regional hegemony would be always sought by powerful states to increase their power as well as to ensure their survival in the international system. 64 only to deal with shifts in the nature of the international system, but also to ensure the reemergence of their country as a great power. These efforts produced a new grand strategy in China's foreign policy in the late 1990s. 65 Beijing believed that the bipolarity of the ColdWar was replaced by a new era of unipolarity which in turn opens certain avenues to multipolarity. China perceived this multipolarity as an opportunity for its peaceful re-emergence in the international system. 66 Yet, others maintain that China is essentially seeking greater status in the international system or, to a lesser extent, they argue that China seeks to challenge the hegemony of the US.
67
Canberra is very concerned to retain the US as a strategic ally, but it is also committed to ensuring its good economic relationship with China through ChAFTA. As argued by Rosecrance, while it is true that Australia may cooperate with the US to contain the reemergence of China, this does not mean Australia has to put its relations with China in danger. 68 Indeed, as Shannon Tow observes, there is a view amongst international relations scholars that 'junior allies' might have a choice whether or not to underpin their senior allies, or change position in response to the rise of a challenger. 69 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd also maintained that Australia should consider the way it treats China and the US or, to be more precise, while Australian should consider China an "important partner", the US should be
